Williams’s Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion by Fussi, Alessandra
 Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVII, 2015, 2, pp. 163-179  
163 
 
Williams’s Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion 
 
Alessandra Fussi 
Università degli Studi di Pisa 
Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere 
alessandra.fussi@unipi.it 
 
“Nobody can be vulgar all alone”1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Section 1 examines four reasons most commonly adduced to support the claim that guilt is 
superior to shame, both psychologically and morally: a) While guilt expresses a concern for 
others shame is a self-centered and selfish emotion. b) While guilt appeals to autonomy shame is 
linked to heteronomy. c) Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, 
resentment, but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust. d) While guilt invites us to 
second-person responses, shame inhibits them. The second part of the paper (sections 2 and 3) 
addresses Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in ancient Greek literature and philosophy. 
Section 2 is dedicated to Williams’s response to the objections concerning selfishness and 
shallowness and to discussing his reply to the charge that since shame belongs to the objective 
attitudes it tends to inhibit second-person responses. Section 3 concentrates on Williams’s 
reflections on heteronomy by focusing on the attitude of others in shame and on the role played 
by the internalized other.  
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Introduction 
 
It is still a widespread belief in moral philosophy that shame is a more primitive 
and less reliable emotion than guilt. As Stephen Darwall puts it in a recent essay,2 
shame and guilt belong to two different spheres of recognition: shame is the 
typical emotion of honor societies, while guilt is at home in societies in which 
respect for one another is mediated by a mutually accountable public space. 
Honor is bestowed and can be taken away by those in a given society who have 
the power to do so, while dignity is not something that can be taken away or, like 
honor, diminished by the behavior of others. 
                                                 
1 J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York 1993, 222. 
2 S. Darwall, “Due tipi di rispetto come riconoscimento per le persone”, in Eguale Rispetto, 
edited by I. Carter, A. E. Galeotti, V. Ottonelli, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2008, 1-19. A revised 
version appeared in English as “Respect as Honor and as Accountability,” in Reason, Value, 
and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., eds. Robert Johnson 
and Mark Timmons, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, 70-88.  
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Those who consider emotions like shame and guilt from a theoretical point of 
view often do not distance themselves from the familiar story according to which 
the ancient Greeks failed to put the concept of the will at the center of their moral 
theories, and had a conception of human life shaped by a “culture of shame.” This 
story is supported by the so-called progressive view of historical development, 
presented in a classic way by Dodds in his book The Greeks and the Irrational and 
by Adkins in Merit and Responsibility.3 Dodds and Adkins detected in ancient 
Greek culture a progressive if slow detachment from a culture of shame towards a 
culture of guilt, which was thought to have reached its best articulation with the 
advent of Christianity. In such historical reconstruction Plato and Aristotle play 
the role of intermediary figures in the progressive development from shame to 
guilt: they anticipate some fundamental discoveries concerning human agency 
and autonomy, while at the same time still expressing in several ways the culture 
of shame to which they originally belonged.  
Contrary to this line of thought, Williams is skeptical of a psychology based on 
the separation between body and soul (SN, 25-26), the notion of the will as a 
mental action in-between a decision and the ensuing action (SN, 41-46), the idea 
that we can be responsible only for actions that derive from our intentions,4 and 
the thesis that guilt is more morally relevant than shame (SN, 75-102). He 
maintains, rather, that psychological and ethical theories can benefit from an 
understanding of agency that includes agent-regret, moral luck, necessity, and 
takes into account the role of shame. In his view, if we are open to such concepts 
we will no longer look down on the ancient Greeks as if they were the 
representatives of a primitive moral outlook. 
Williams is not inclined to historical nostalgia: his point is not that the Greeks 
were right in their approach to the most fundamental ethical questions. Rather, 
he refuses to assume with progressivism that modernity, whether in the shape of 
Kantianism or Utilitarianism, made substantial progress in tackling problems 
that had supposedly not been properly addressed by classical Greek philosophy 
and literature. He asks us to distance ourselves from such a theory. He thinks that 
                                                 
3 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1951; 
A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1960. 
4 See, Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, Sather Classical Lectures, Volume 57, University 
of California Press, Berkeley 1993, 64: “Progressivist writers refer to a concept of moral 
responsibility that we supposedly enjoy and the Greeks lacked, but it is unclear what they have 
in mind. Their thought seems most typically to be that the Greeks, or at least archaic Greeks, 
blamed and sanctioned people for things that they did unintentionally, or again—though this 
distinction is often neglected—for things that, like Agamemnon, they did intentionally but in a 
strange state of mind. We are thought not to do this, or at least to regard it as unjust. But if 
this means that the Greeks paid no attention to intentions, while we make everything turn on 
the issue of intentions, or at least think that we should, this is doubly false.” From now on 
Shame and Necessity will be abbreviated as SN. 
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by accepting the possibility that we can learn something from the Greeks we will 
also be ready to assume a skeptical attitude towards moral concepts that we tend 
to take for granted.5  
Williams’s strategy in Shame and Necessity takes two directions: 1) He tries to 
bring back to life a view of the Greeks’ ethical life as free as possible from the 
prejudices of progressive history. 2) He argues that by examining our ethical 
concepts in the light of the psychological and ethical patterns articulated by the 
Greeks we can draw different maps of our emotional life.  
If we understand well what aidos or aischyne were for the Greeks, our own 
understanding of the demarcations between shame and guilt will be significantly 
affected, and this in turn will shake our assurance that we really know what we 
mean when we characterize ancient Greek culture as a culture of shame.  
In section 1 I will consider four reasons most commonly adduced to support 
the claim that guilt is superior to shame, both psychologically and morally. I will 
focus on the arguments mentioned by Williams, and, in two cases, on Darwall’s 
own version of them.  
In sections 2 and 3 I will address Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in 
ancient Greek literature. In section 2 the focus will be on Williams’s response to 
the objections concerning selfishness and shallowness, and on his position 
regarding the charge that shame belongs to the objective attitudes and inhibits 
second-person responses. In section 3 I will concentrate on Williams’s response to 
the charge that shame, as opposed to guilt, is heteronomous and on his account of 
the role of others in shame. Here I will discuss three points: a) the distinction 
Williams finds necessary between the concrete other and the internalized other; b) 
the attitude of the audience before whom we feel shame; c) the internalized other 
as the focus of real social expectations.  
 
1. Four Objections to Shame 
  
In Shame and Necessity Williams argues that the opposition between guilt and 
shame is often rests on ideological preconceptions, but he also concedes that the 
progressivist position is based on arguments. In order to understand Williams’s 
                                                 
5 SN, 5-6: “These stories are deeply misleading, both historically and ethically. Many of the 
questions they generate, of when this, that, or the other element of a developed moral 
consciousness is supposed to have arisen, are unanswerable, because the notion of a developed 
moral consciousness that gives rise to these questions is basically a myth. These theories 
measure the ideas and the experience of the ancient Greeks against modern conceptions of 
freedom, autonomy, inner responsibility, moral obligation, and so forth, and it is assumed that 
we have an entirely adequate control of these conceptions themselves. But if we ask ourselves 
honestly, I believe that we shall find that we have no clear idea of the substance of these 
conceptions, and hence no clear idea of what it is that, according to the progressivist accounts, 
the Greeks did not have.” 
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own defense of shame, it may be useful to identify first the criticisms that are 
most commonly addressed to this emotion. Here are some of the reasons why 
many maintain that guilt is morally superior to shame: 
1) Shame is charged with being a self-centered and selfish emotion. Adkins 
maintains that in Homer shame serves the competitive virtues of the warrior 
society. Courage in war, the ability to do heroic deeds, personal success and 
victory are the qualities with which the best man (the kalos kai agathos) is 
identified. Failure and defeat make someone feel ashamed of himself. Success and 
victory are of course public values, and this is why being good means, ultimately, 
to be spoken well of, while being bad is to be despised or ignored. Seeking fame is 
therefore the main goal, and fear of a bad reputation the central preoccupation. I 
care for my reputation: as Bernard Williams points out, when he gives voice to the 
critics of shame, “it is simply my face to save or lose, so its values are egoistic” 
(SN, 78). Guilt, on the other hand, expresses my preoccupation with the 
sufferance of others, and is therefore considered an other-regarding emotion. 
2) Guilt invites us to look into ourselves, to discover our deepest intentions and 
responsibilities: it is an emotional expression of our being autonomous agents. We 
feel guilty when others ask us to give an account of our actions or omissions, and if 
we believe that their indignation or resentment is justified. By contrast, shame is 
felt when we feel exposed to the wrong people in the wrong situation (SN, 78). 
Since it is a response to how others see us, shame is connected with the idea of 
losing face, and for this reason it is often charged with being a superficial emotion. 
Shame gives central stage to appearance and the opinions of others: hence it is the 
emotion of conformism. So, while guilt is deep, shame is shallow. While guilt 
presupposes autonomy, shame points to heteronomy.  
3) Differently from shame, guilt implies equal footing with others, i.e., our 
mutual accountability. We do not lose but rather affirm our dignity when we feel 
guilty: by recognizing that others have a right to consider us accountable, we 
acknowledge our right to speak in our defense, or to acknowledge our faults.  
This is not the case with shame. As Darwall maintains,6 shame does not belong 
to a second-person standpoint: it is third-personal. When we feel shame we are not 
interlocutors of those who call us to respond of our actions, but objects of their 
gaze. Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, resentment, 
but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust.7 To the real or imaginary 
spectators before whom we feel ashamed we appear as objects. Our real or 
                                                 
6 S. Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2006, 70-72. 
7 For the distinction between reactive and objective attitudes, see P. Strawson, “Freedom and 
Resentment”, in Freedom and Resentment and other Essays, Methuen, London 1974, 1-28; for a 
critical assessment of Darwall’s interpretation of Strawson’s essay, see J. Deigh, “Reactive 
Attitudes Revisited”, in C. Bagnoli, Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011, 197-216.  
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imaginary spectators have an authority over us, not, as in the case of guilt, an 
authority shared with us. While with guilt we are on an equal footing with the 
other, with shame we are seen qua inferior. Darwall here follows Sartre:  
 
By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing 
judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the 
Other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image 
in the mind of another. Such an image in fact, would be imputable wholly to 
the Other and so could not “touch” me. I could feel irritation, or anger before 
it as before a bad portrait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness 
or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. 
Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me.8  
 
The moment I become ashamed my freedom escapes me, because I become an 
object for another and at the same time I recognize that I am that object. 
4) Typical expressions of guilt are in the second person: confession, apology, 
reparation are ways to keep the relationships with others alive. Shame, on the 
other hand, makes us desire to hide: we do not want to meet the other’s gaze, we 
do not want to reciprocate, we do not feel called to respond, we are not addressed 
but merely looked at. We feel ugly and despised; we would want to disappear from 
view. Hence, while guilt invites us to second-person responses, shame inhibits 
them. 
 
2. Shame revisited 
 
Williams responds to the criticisms leveled against the so-called culture of shame, 
with which the Greeks are identified, by following a rather complex strategy. 
First of all, he questions the stark opposition between shame and guilt and 
shows that aidos, the Greek term commonly translated as shame, can be properly 
understood only if one realizes that it contains some fundamental aspects of guilt. 
Secondarily, he addresses the objections to shame as a shallow, heteronomous and 
selfish emotion, and argues that they are misunderstandings due to a superficial 
reading of ancient texts. Thirdly, he explains that shame responds to concerns 
that are wider than the concerns of guilt and, to a certain extent, include them (in 
some instances, when shame fails to include the concerns of guilt Williams argues 
that it is for the best). 
His response is conducted by analyzing literary passages: from Homer (who 
was the main target of Adkins’ theory concerning the culture of shame) to the 
tragic writers. Only occasionally does Williams comment upon classical 
philosophical texts, and never in great detail. This is one of the main limits of 
                                                 
8 J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 222. See also 261. 
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Shame and Necessity, and it is especially relevant with respect to Plato and 
Aristotle, who, as I mentioned earlier, were mostly viewed by progressivist 
historians as improving upon the original Greek culture of shame by 
distinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy, interiority and exteriority, 
conventional or political values on the one hand, and moral values on the other 
hand.  
Perhaps it is because of the priority given to the polemical stance against the 
progressivist view that in Shame and Necessity one does not find the sensitivity 
one might have expected from Williams to the significance of the literary aspects 
in Plato’s dialogues. Williams is clearly aware that the characters and the 
dramatic setting in Plato’s dialogues deserve keen philosophic attention: 
 
In contrasting philosophy and literature, we should remember that some 
philosophy is itself literature. Philosophers often suppose that the kinds of 
difficulties raised for them by a literary text are not presented by texts that 
they classify as philosophical, but this idea is produced largely by the selective 
way in which they use them. We should bear in mind how drastically some of 
these texts are being treated when they are read in this way. […] One 
philosopher with whom the cost of these processes is especially high is one who 
will be relevant to this inquiry, Plato (SN, 13). 
 
Unfortunately, Williams subsequently sets aside the problem of the proper 
interpretation of the literary aspects in Plato’s dialogues, and in chapter 4 
proceeds to raise his criticisms to Plato’s conception of autonomy as if he were 
addressing a proto-Kantian theory (and one should add that Kant himself is given 
a far too schematic approach in this book). Williams’s criticism of Plato’s stance 
towards shame in the example of Gyges’ ring is directed to the theory presented 
by a character, Glaucon, whom Williams arbitrarily identifies with Plato himself. 
Yet, Glaucon is only one of several characters in Plato’s Republic. Williams does 
not seem to appreciate the difference between theories held by characters in a 
Platonic dialogue and the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.9  
                                                 
9 Williams’s attitude towards Plato shifts from sympathetic in “The Legacy of Greek 
Philosophy” (in The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal, ed. M. I. Finley, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1981, 202–255) to negative in Shame and Necessity. It becomes appreciative again 
in Plato: the Invention of Philosophy (Phoenix, London 1998). Williams’s essays on the history of 
philosophy (including “The Legacy of Greek Philosophy,” “Plato: the Invention of 
Philosophy,” and six more essays on Socrates and Plato) were collected by M. Burnyeat in B. 
Williams, The Sense of the Past. Essays in the History of Philosophy, ed. M. Burnyeat, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2006. For a reconstruction of the motivations 
underlying Williams’s fluctuating positions towards Plato, cfr. A. A. Long, “Williams on Greek 
literature and philosophy,” in A. Thomas, ed., Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2007, 155-80. For a critical assessment of Williams’s objections to Plato in Shame 
and Necessity, cfr. T. Irwin, “Critical Notice of B. Williams, Shame and Necessity,” Apeiron 27, 
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With respect to Aristotle, the problem is somewhat different. It would have 
been helpful to find in Shame and Necessity a treatment of Aristotle’s conception 
of shame, with which Williams’s theory shares some fundamental aspects. 
Aristotle’s discussion of this emotion (the terms he employs are aidos and aischyne) 
can be found in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Rhetoric. It is debatable to 
what extent the meanings of aidos and aischyne overlap, but, as David Konstan 
helpfully pointed out, in Aristotle’s ethical works aidos never refers to past 
events.10 Aischyne, on the other hand, can refer to past, present and future events, 
as is evident in Aristotle’s definition of shame in the Rhetoric.11 The reference to 
the three temporal dimensions allows aischyne to play a role similar to guilt with 
respect to actions that one blames oneself for having done, and to function as a 
prospective and inhibitory emotion with respect to actions that one finds debasing 
but attractive.  
Williams’s analysis of aidos in the Greek world is very close to the Aristotelian 
view both for what concerns the intersection between the ancient conception of 
shame and the modern conception of guilt, and for those aspects of shame which 
embrace ethical phenomena wider than those relevant for guilt. For example, as 
Aristotle makes clear, shame (aischyne) can be felt not just concerning actions and 
behaviors for which one feels responsible, but also in situations of disadvantage 
with respect to one’s peers, or when someone is subjected to violence and 
humiliation. This is a point that from Williams’s perspective can be understood 
and appreciated in all its importance and it is a pity that it is not explicitly 
discussed in Shame and Necessity, where Aristotle’s conception of shame is only 
left in the background.12 
Let us now turn to Williams’s response to the charges leveled against shame. 
Points 1) and 2) can be summarized by saying that shame is accused of being a 
selfish, shallow and heteronomous emotion, especially in contrast with guilt. We 
can of course imagine the kind of shame felt by someone who is solely driven by a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1994, 45-76.  
10 D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2006, 95. See also the following observation: “The 
emotion, as Aristotle understands it, is uniform; what varies is simply the timing of the 
perceived ills. The lexicographers are thus wrong to split aischyne into sub-definitions, for there 
is nothing to disambiguate” (99). On the debate concerning the relationship between aidos and 
aischyne in EN, IV, 1128b15-23, see W.M.A Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric II. A Commentary, 
Fordham University Press, New York 1988, 105-107. 
11 Rhet., ii 6.1383b13-16: “Let shame [aischyne] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation 
concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into 
disrespect, and [let] shamelessness [be defined as] a belittling about these same things” (G.A. 
Kennedy, trans., Aristotle: On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1991). 
12 For a discussion of Aristotle’s conception of shame and humiliation in light of Williams, see A. 
Fussi, “Aristotle on Shame,” Ancient Philosophy 35, 2015, 113-135. 
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preoccupation with appearance and the opinion of others. For such a person a 
critical stance with respect to conventional values will be out of the question, and 
his feeling ashamed at his failures to adapt to the expectations of others will 
indeed express his conformism. However, this is not the way shame works most of 
the time for most people, and it is certainly not how it was meant to work in 
ancient Greek literature. 
Let us begin with the charge of egoism. As we have seen, Adkins claimed that 
shame in Homer served competitive values, and was therefore a selfish emotion. If 
this had really been the case, Williams responds, we would find only instances of 
shame in the face of defeat or failure to overcome others. Yet, in the Homeric 
works characters are shown to be blamed for actions and situations that exemplify 
breaches both in competitive and in collaborative virtues. Williams invites us to 
remember that the terms aidos (shame) and nemesis (indignation) form a system: I 
will be ashamed of actions that would make me indignant or angry if they were 
performed by others. If we pay close attention to the kinds of actions and 
situations that are the object of shame and indignation in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, we will realize that selfish concerns, such as personal success and victory 
in battle, are not the only objects of such emotions. One can feel indignant at 
someone running away in battle, but indignation can be an adequate response also 
to such actions as giving poison for arrows, sending one’s mother away, or 
behaving like Penelope’s suitors in the Odyssey (SN, 80). Shameful actions include 
failures to behave in a generous way, to respect one’s parents, to have a sense of 
what I can do to others and others can do to me in such a way that we both 
preserve our self-respect.  
Adkins’ distinction between competitive and collaborative virtues does not 
help us to isolate those actions that in the Iliad and the Odyssey would be 
stigmatized as shameful. Failures in generosity are as blameworthy and shameful 
as failures in courage. The opposition between shame and guilt from the point of 
view of selfishness versus altruism is therefore due to a prejudice in favor of guilt 
rather than to the actual analysis of Greek texts.  
We should note here that if nemesis and aidos form a system of reciprocal 
expectations and responses, then the charges raised in points 3) and 4) fall: 
 
The reaction in Homer to someone who has done something that shame should 
have prevented is nemesis, a reaction that can be understood, according to the 
context, as ranging from shock, contempt, and malice to righteous rage and 
indignation. It should not be thought that nemesis and its related words are 
ambiguous. It is defined as a reaction, and what it psychologically consists of 
properly depends on what particular violation of aidos it is a reaction to. As 
Redfield has put it, aides and nemesis are “a reflexive pair” (SN, 80). 
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In the interpretation that Williams draws from Redfield, nemesis is clearly a 
reactive response: the indignation felt at failures of aidos calls the other to answer 
for his actions and omissions rather than treat him as an object to be judged from 
a third-personal point of view. And if aidos and nemesis form a “reflective pair”, 
then aidos itself is a reactive attitude. The shame felt by Telemachus, when he 
realizes that he forgot to close the door to the storeroom from which the suitors 
are now taking out armors and spears, entails, among other things, a recognition 
of responsibility and a desire to make amends (SN, 50-52). Telemachus’ reaction is 
not a desire to hide from view: rather, it is a response that recognizes the 
authority of others to blame him for what he (albeit unintentionally) did. 
Williams analyzes the concept of responsibility in the Homeric poems and 
shows that it entails regret and the need for reparation. The opposition between 
objective and reactive attitudes, with shame belonging to the former and guilt to 
the latter, does therefore not apply to aidos, which seems rather to entail traits 
that the opposition in question attributes to the sphere of guilt (SN, 90-91). The 
stark contrast between shame and guilt from which the progressivist view took its 
bearing in distinguishing us from the Greeks ought to be reconsidered.13  
 
3. The Other in Shame 
 
Let us now turn to discuss how Williams addresses the charge that shame, as 
opposed to guilt, is heteronomous, i.e., that the person feeling shame is dependent 
on the opinions and values of others. In this context Williams asks us to 
concentrate on three points:  
a) We should distinguish between a concrete other and an internalized other. 
b) We should consider the attitude of the other. Do we need a critical audience 
in order to feel ashamed?  
c) We should ask ourselves if the other who elicits our shame can be anybody 
or needs some further characterization. 
 Williams argues that it is a trivial mistake to think that shame is only 
triggered in the presence of others who witness our actions and find them wanting. 
                                                 
13 In his review of Shame and Necessity (Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 413, Jan., 1995, 214-
219) Colin Allen asks whom Williams is referring to when he speaks of “we” and “the Greeks.” 
Williams anticipates the objection to the usage of the first person plural by explaining that it is 
an invitational “we”: “More than one friend, reading this book in an earlier version, has asked 
who this ubiquitous ‘we’ represents. It refers to people in a certain cultural situation, but who is 
in that situation? Obviously it cannot mean everybody in the world, or everybody in the West. 
I hope it does not mean only people who already think as I do. The best I can say is that ‘we’ 
operates not through a previously fixed designation, but through invitation. (The same is true, I 
believe, of ‘we’ in much philosophy, and particularly in ethics.) It is not a matter of ‘I’ telling 
‘you’ what I and others think, but of my asking you to consider to what extent you and I think 
some things and perhaps need to think others.” (SN, note 7, 171).  
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If we understand the Homeric culture as indeed a “culture”, and not just as a 
heap of facts from the past or a collection of actions and speeches lacking any 
internal structure, we have to acknowledge that the characters we encounter in 
the Iliad and Odyssey exhibit the culture of shame in their distinctive manners: 
they typically do certain things, and would never do other things. Now, the idea 
that shame is fear of being seen by others while doing blameworthy actions fails to 
account for the fact that someone like Achilles would find certain actions simply 
below himself, regardless of whether someone or no one saw him. Can we conceive 
of Achilles stealing by night the gifts that he had arrogantly refused to accept 
from the embassy in the clear light of day? Would such an action satisfy his sense 
of honor? Petty stealing, doing in secret what he could not do openly, is simply 
not part of Achilles’ character.  
Achilles is not Gyges, who, having found a ring of invisibility, commits all 
sorts of crimes. Before finding the ring, Gyges looked like a good person. So tells us 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, who uses the example of Gyges to prove that people 
follow the law not because of justice, but in fear of punishment. Williams takes 
issue with Glaucon’s thesis precisely because the example assumes that norms 
cannot be internalized. 14  
If shame were operative only in the presence of concrete witnesses Achilles, 
one of the most important representatives of a culture of shame, would not be 
inhibited from stealing when nobody could see him. If such a picture is 
unthinkable, it is because, as Williams points out, understanding Achilles means 
understanding his manners, and this implies that his sense of shame is not 
reducible to paying lip service to the expectations of those who happen to be 
present in the scene of his life at the time (SN, 81).  
If shame entails reference to another, the other must be capable of playing a 
role independently of his concrete presence: the other of shame is an internalized 
other. Shame plays an inhibitory role even when one is alone and certain that 
nobody will find out what he is tempted to do. If this is the case, then the 
opposition with guilt is even in this case less stark than one was initially led to 
believe. Shame is far from a shallow emotion: like guilt, its roots are in our 
interiority. The concrete other can trigger my shame, but is not what shame can 
be reduced to.  
                                                 
14 SN, 98-101. The problem with Williams’s objection is that he attributes Glaucon’s thesis to 
Plato. In my view, Socrates responds to the example of Gyges when, in book IV of the Republic 
he introduces thumos, the part of the soul responsible for the internalization of norms. Thumos 
makes us respond with anger and indignation to the injustices committed by others, and with 
shame when we are to blame. I have discussed Williams’s objection to Glaucon’s example, as 
well as what I take to be Socrates’ response, in A. Fussi, “La critica di Williams alla Repubblica 
di Platone,” Méthexis, Volume 22, 2009, 39-59; see also A. Fussi, “Inconsistencies in Glaucon’s 
Account of Justice,” Polis, The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought (UK), vol. 24.1, 
Spring 2007, 43-69.   
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Let us now focus on the other’s attitude. Do we need a critical audience in 
order to feel shame?  
In shame one feels exposed. In Being and Nothingness Sartre discusses two 
examples: in the first example, a person making a vulgar gesture suddenly realizes 
that he is being seen. Now the gesture, which had previously clung unreflectively 
to the subject, abruptly becomes a matter of judgment, a vulgar gesture, 
something that makes him shudder in shame. In the second example (which 
Williams takes up in his discussion) someone is induced by jealousy to peep 
though a keyhole. He is entirely absorbed in the action when he is abruptly 
brought to self-reflection by the sound of some steps in the hall. In both cases 
shame comes as the painful realization that the person is doing something vulgar 
at the same time as he realizes that he is being observed.15 Shame is seeing 
ourselves through the eyes of another whose gaze is critical of us.  
From Sartre onwards, scholars assumed that most cases of shame would 
involve an audience taking a negative attitude towards a subject, who, in turn, 
shares the audience’s critical view. Yet, as Gabriele Taylor has pointed out in her 
pivotal study on the emotions of self-assessment, one can feel ashamed of being 
admired by the wrong audience or for the wrong reasons.16 If I feel contempt for 
someone, his admiration can trigger my shame. If the other has reasons to feel 
that I should be flattered by his admiration, I may, in turn, have reasons to feel 
ashamed of it. 
Williams, like Taylor, refers to Max Scheler’s example of a model who, having 
been sitting naked for a painter, at some point realizes that the painter is no 
longer absorbed in his work but looks at her body with desire. All of a sudden the 
model is no longer protected by an impersonal relation with the painter: she feels 
exposed and ashamed of her nudity.  
Of course shame might not be her only reaction: she could feel anger at the 
painter’s unprofessional attitude, or fear if she thought that he might assault her. 
Two paintings come to mind, one by Rembrandt and one by Artemisia 
Gentileschi, in which we see a woman realizing all of a sudden that her nudity is 
exposed to the gaze of two lecherous men.17 The scene portrayed is the famous 
biblical episode of Susanna and the Elders. Two corrupt judges blackmail Susanna, 
the virtuous wife of a wealthy man, having introduced themselves into her garden 
while she was bathing, and demanding sexual favors.  
 
                                                 
15 See J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 221 for the first example and 259 for the second 
example.  
16 G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt. Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1985, 59ff.. 
17 I owe to Peter Hacker, who let me read part of his book manuscript on the emotions (The 
Passions – a Study of Human Nature), the reference to Rembrandt’s Susanna and the Elders as 
an “an archetypal representation of the primal feeling of shame.” 
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Rembrandt van Rijn, Susanna and the Elders, 1647. Oil-on-panel painting, 76.6 by 92.8 cm  
Gemäldegalerie, Berlin, Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
Artemisia Gentileschi, Susanna and The Elders, 1610. Oil on canvas, 170 by 121cm. Graf von 
Schonborn Kunstsammlungen. Schloss Weissenstein, Pommersfelden, Germany. 
 
 
In Artemisia’s painting, the two well-dressed men are very close to Susanna’s 
naked body, so that the stress is not as much on their gaze as on their threatening 
proximity. They are whispering to each other, while Susanna averts her face in 
revulsion.  
Rembrandt portrays Susanna while she is looking away in front of her. We can 
imagine she is meeting the gaze of the painting’s viewers, who are thus involved in 
the voyeuristic scene. One man is grabbing the cloth which barely covers part of 
her body; more than excited by her nakedness he looks reflective and malicious, as 
if he were pondering how he could profit from the situation. The other man, more 
at a distance, is leering at her with a sort of amused lust.  
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Artemisia portrays a woman who feels in danger — the scene is one of terror 
— while Rembrandt focuses our attention on Susanna’s shame at being exposed 
to the two men’s intrusive and lascivious gaze. In both paintings the men show no 
sign of uneasiness about what they are doing. They are shameless.  
Even though the two painters represent differently Susanna’s emotional 
reaction to the men’s voyeurism, she certainly does not face a critical audience. 
Susanna (or, rather, her body) is represented without any doubt as an object of 
desire in the men’s eyes. If what we recognize in Rembrandt’s painting is shame, 
then we have to wonder if a critical gaze is relevant at all in generating this 
emotional reaction.  
A similar point can be made with respect to the model in Scheler’s example. 
The painter is certainly not critical of her. Actually, she might even feel that from 
his perspective she should consider herself flattered by his sexual attention. The 
shame she feels cannot derive, then, from her identification with the attitude of 
the audience. Taylor suggests that what is involved here is a more complex 
reflective structure: 
 
The model need not see herself as the artist sees her. But as the result of 
realizing her relation to him she sees herself in a new light. The point can be 
expressed by introducing a second, higher order point of view from which she 
is seen not as an object of sexual interest, but is seen as being seen as such an 
object. With this point of view she does identify, and this point of view is a 
critical one. The adverse judgment, however, comes not from the artist, but 
comes from herself. It is critical in that it pronounces it wrong for her to be so 
seen, at least at this time and by this audience.18 
 
Williams, in turn, does not think that we necessarily need to imagine two 
kinds of judgments — the positive judgment belonging to the concrete other (the 
painter’s desire for the model), and the negative judgment, belonging to the model 
(that she should not be seen as a sexual object by such a man). What is relevant in 
the scene is that the model feels suddenly exposed. Previously her nakedness did 
not make her feel vulnerable: as Williams puts it, “she had previously been 
clothed in her role as a model; that has been taken from her, and she is left truly 
exposed, to a desiring eye.” (SN, 222). In other words, the feeling of shame is a 
reaction to the consciousness of her loss of power.  
The idea that shame may be connected to a loss of power is interesting, though 
in this particular case, as we have seen in the two different pictorial 
interpretations of Susanna and the Elders, the sense of being exposed could cause 
fear rather than shame. What is it that makes Susanna’s awareness of her loss of 
                                                 
18 G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1985, 61. 
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power turn into shame rather than fear? 
 In the case of shame the loss of power is not linked, as in the case of fear, to a 
concern with the consequences for one’s safety, but, rather, to a concern with 
one’s worth. The model feels ashamed at the thought that the painter might think 
it appropriate to look at her like that. If this is the case, though, one can see why 
Taylor thought it necessary to introduce a second, higher order point of view. 
Williams, on the other hand, introduces the higher order point of view as a second 
step in the process by which a certain figure is internalized. In his view, what 
initially appears as a loss of power in the eyes of a concrete observer, can become a 
loss of power or a failing in the eyes of an internalized other: 
 
The root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in being at a 
disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general phrase, a loss of power. 
The sense of shame is a reaction of the subject to the consciousness of this loss: 
in Gabriele Taylor’s phrase, quoted in the text, it is “the emotion of self-
protection.” […] More generally, the loss of power is not actually constituted 
by the presence of a watcher, even though it is still a loss of power “in the eyes 
of another.” A process of internalization is now possible, and “bootstrapping” 
can proceed in terms of an increasing ethical content given to the occasions of 
shame (SN, 220-221). 
 
In other words: what in the experience of nakedness is a loss of power caused 
by a concrete observer, becomes, with internalization, a loss of power or failing in 
the eyes of an internalized figure, and being actually seen by someone while doing 
something that one would consider a failing is no longer necessary. Suppose I am a 
writer. Realizing that my novel appeals to people whose tastes I despise makes me 
feel like a cheap writer. Someone I despise, however, can be right about my 
failings. In this case my shame is compounded: I agree with the negative 
assessment, and I find it even more painful because it comes from a person whose 
views I normally do not take into account. 
Williams takes up Taylor’s point concerning the attitude of the audience, and 
applies it thus to his theory of shame: 
 
Shame need not be just a matter of being seen, but of being seen by an 
observer with a certain view. Indeed, the view taken by the observer need not 
itself be critical: people can be ashamed of being admired by the wrong 
audience in the wrong way. Equally, they need not be ashamed of being 
poorly viewed, if the view is that of an observer for whom they feel contempt. 
Hector was indeed afraid that someone inferior to him would be able to 
criticize him, but that was because he thought the criticism would be true, and 
the fact that such a person could make it would only make things worse. The 
mere fact that such a person had something hostile to say would not in itself 
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necessarily concern him. Similarly on the Greek side of the war, the opinions of 
Nestor carried weight, and those of Thersites did not (SN, 82).  
 
Shame is not just in the face of someone, but about something, and, as we have 
now seen at some lenghth, some actions do inspire shame even if those whose gaze 
is upon us applaud what we are doing or believe that we should be pleased by 
what they are doing.  
This implies that we should distinguish the perspective of the agent from the 
perspective of the audience by focusing on the content of the judgment that plays 
a role in shame. The concrete other whose gaze triggers our shame may or may not 
judge things the way we do. If we despise someone’s judgment we will not be 
ashamed in front of him, unless we realize that what we are doing is indeed 
shameful, and we come to realize it not because our witness is reliable, but because 
having a witness makes us take a distance from what we are doing.  
In sum: there is a difference between the internalized other and the concrete 
other. The internalized other is someone whose judgment we share; the concrete 
other is someone who may be critical, admiring, indifferent, and whose judgment 
we need not share.19  
If being admired by someone we despise makes us feel ashamed, then the 
internalized other, the other whose judgment we share, does not coincide with the 
concrete other who happens to approve what we are doing. It is not true, then, 
that shame is fear of losing face before any kind of audience, or that it is a 
superficial emotion which relies only on external appearance.  
To some extent it is true that shame exposes our being dependent on the 
opinions of others, but we should also add that the others in question must be 
                                                 
19 See SN, 82: “Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea 
of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an 
imagined other will do. It is not so, of course, with the most elementary case, the shame of 
exposure when naked; someone who was afraid in that case of being exposed to a merely 
imaginary observer would be afraid of his own nakedness, and his fear would be pathological. 
But the imaginary observer can enter very early in the progression towards more generalized 
social shame. Sartre describes a man who is looking through a keyhole and suddenly realizes 
that he is being watched. He might think that it was shameful to do it, not just to be seen doing 
it, and in that case, an imagined watcher could be enough to trigger the reactions of shame.” 
Sartre is claiming that what forces the man to move from being completely immersed in the 
activity of looking through the keyhole to becoming conscious of himself is the presence of 
another. Williams may be moving too quickly here from exposure to the gaze of another to the 
imagined gaze of the imagined other. For a critical view of the role of the internalized other in 
the explanation of shame, see J. A. Deonna, R. Rodogno, and F. Teroni, In Defense of Shame: 
The Faces of an Emotion, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012. 
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people whose opinions we respect. This was a central point in Aristotle’s 
treatment of aischyne.20 Williams finds it expressed in Homer: 
 
Nausikaa is afraid of what people will say if they see her with the handsome 
stranger, and that there will be a scandal; but she adds: 
 ‘And I myself would think badly of a girl who acted so’. 
[…] An agent will be motivated by prospective shame in the face of people 
who would be angered by conduct that, in turn, they would avoid for those 
same reasons. Nausikaa is conscious of how she shares with others the 
reactions that they might have to her. […] There has to be something for 
these interrelated attitudes to be about. It is not merely a structure by which I 
know that you will be annoyed with me because you know that I will be 
annoyed with you. These reciprocal attitudes have a content: some kinds of 
behavior are admired, others accepted, others despised, and it is those 
attitudes that are internalized, not simply the prospect of hostile reactions 
(SN, 83-84). 
 
Let us now turn to the third point highlighted by Williams. By distinguishing 
the views and the attitude of the concrete other from those of the internalized 
other we come to realize that the problem of heteronomy is more complex than 
the usual charges raised against shame may lead us to believe. However, even if 
we grant that the other of shame is not just anybody who happens to be our 
witness, we could still object that the values on the basis of which we respond 
with shame are heteronomous in the sense that the internalized other is a 
representative of the society, of the neighbors, of others with whose moral criteria 
we uncritically identify. 
Here Williams warns us about the risks of a Manichean attitude. It would be 
tempting to defend shame from the charge of heteronomy by assuming that the 
internalized other is free of any influences derived from the contingent factors of 
our social, historical and political life. In this perspective the other, in so far as he 
or she plays a role in shame, would simply be someone whose judgment we share. 
The important point is not who the other is, but what he or she thinks. If he thinks 
what we think, we preserve our autonomy of judgment: the charge of heteronomy 
vanishes, or is in any way considerably weakened. The internalized other, if we 
follow this line of thinking, is just an echo of our conscience.  
If we assume this purified sense of the internalized other, however, we face a 
problem: in what sense can we still talk of an “other,” if all that remains after 
                                                 
20 “Since shame is imagination (phantasia) about a loss of reputation and for its own sake, not 
for its results, and since no one cares about reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those 
who hold an opinion of him, necessarily a person feels shame toward those whose opinion he 
takes account of” (Rhet., ii 6.1384a24-27). 
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having purified the other of its accretions is the content itself (that this or that 
action is vulgar), and not the gaze that makes us aware of our vulgar gesture, and 
the perspective from which it appears vulgar? 
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot hope to save shame from the charge 
of heteronomy by grounding its content in our own judgment, while at the same 
time holding on to the phenomenological insight that in shame we feel exposed, 
i.e., that we feel shame in the face of another. If we think that the real or 
imaginary other does indeed play a significant role in the emotion we cannot allow 
it to turn into a ghost empty of all determinations.  
Williams’s solution is not to defend shame from the charge of heteronomy at 
all costs, but to make us aware that an attack on shame in the name of autonomy 
may be misguided: 
 
It is a mistake to take that reductive step and to suppose that there are only 
two options: that the other in ethical thought must be an identifiable 
individual or a representative of the neighbors, on the one hand, or else be 
nothing at all except an echo chamber for my solitary moral voice. Those 
alternatives leave out much of the substance of actual ethical life. The 
internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and idealized, but he is 
potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. He 
can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in 
one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me (SN, 84).  
 
Once again it is by reference to Greek literature that Williams invites us to see 
why it is important to hold on to the idea that the internalized other is 
“potentially somebody rather than nobody.” Someone who, like Ajax, is led by 
shame to consider suicide a necessity, may appear at first sight irrational. 
Williams’s subtle analysis makes us listen to the other whose disappointment Ajax 
cannot face. He cannot continue to live in a world in which those he respects can 
no longer respect him.  
One can try to fill the concept of respect with purely abstract content, or claim 
that the voice of autonomy is pure and our dignity unshakable. Williams leads us 
down the opposite path: by paying heed to shame we become sensitive to the 
reciprocal expectations that bind us with each other, and willing to question the 
idea that concepts like dignity or autonomy are really helpful in establishing 
clear-cut historical boundaries. 
 
